Catholic University Law Review
Volume 64
Issue 4 Summer 2015

Article 6

9-22-2015

The Discovery Sombrero and Other Metaphors for Litigation
William H. J. Hubbard

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
William H. Hubbard, The Discovery Sombrero and Other Metaphors for Litigation, 64 Cath. U. L. Rev. 867
(2015).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol64/iss4/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

The Discovery Sombrero and Other Metaphors for Litigation
Cover Page Footnote
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful for comments from Douglas
Baird, Emily Buss, Steve Hagenbuch, Ashish Prasad, and participants in the faculty work-in-progress
workshop at the University of Chicago Law School. I thank Matthew Ladew and Hangcheng (Robert) Zhou
for valuable research assistance. I thank the Paul H. Leffman Fund and the Coase-Sandor Institute for
Law & Economics for research support.

This article is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol64/iss4/6

THE DISCOVERY SOMBRERO AND OTHER
METAPHORS FOR LITIGATION
William H. J. Hubbard+
I. LAW GOVERNING PRESERVATION AND DISCOVERY ...................................875
II. THE PRESERVATION COSTS SURVEY .........................................................878
A. Obstacles to Empirical Work on Preservation ................................... 878
B. Survey Methodology ........................................................................... 880
C. Sample Characteristics ...................................................................... 883
III. THREE STYLIZED FACTS ABOUT LITIGATION ..........................................885
A. The Discovery Sombrero .................................................................... 885
B. The Preservation Iceberg ................................................................... 889
C. The Long Tail of Costs ....................................................................... 894
IV. THREE IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND RULEMAKING ................................897
A. The Sombrero and the Erie/Hanna Boundary .................................... 897
B. The Iceberg and the Law/Technology Boundary................................ 902
C. The Long Tail and Transsubstantivity/Tailoring
Boundary........................................................................................... 903
V. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................906

The process of discovery in civil litigation is doubly shrouded in fog.
Fundamentally, as the term “discovery” connotes, the discovery process
involves parties who lack complete knowledge about their dispute attempting to
use the litigation process to obtain information.1 Almost by definition, the
parties and the court operate in a fog of uncertainty when they undertake
discovery. There is nothing necessarily troubling about this uncertainty, of
course; discovery exists precisely to dispel it.
However, there is a second, more troubling layer of obscurity. We know very
little about the timing, volume, and cost of discovery in our civil justice system.
In what fraction of cases does the gathering of documents in anticipation of
discovery begin before a lawsuit is even filed? How much data is gathered in
the average case? Setting aside the fees paid to outside counsel, how much does
+
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful for comments from
Douglas Baird, Emily Buss, Steve Hagenbuch, Ashish Prasad, and participants in the faculty workin-progress workshop at the University of Chicago Law School. I thank Matthew Ladew and
Hangcheng (Robert) Zhou for valuable research assistance. I thank the Paul H. Leffman Fund and
the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics for research support.
1. But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636‒37 (1989)
(noting that the threat of discovery is sometimes used as a bargaining tool to exact a favorable
settlement rather than as a purely information gathering tool).
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discovery cost the parties, in terms of time and money, in any given case? It is
scarcely an exaggeration to say no one knows.
While many practicing attorneys have rich and detailed knowledge of their
own experiences, commentators have struggled to collect and organize this
anecdotal information into a coherent empirical picture. To this day there is no
consensus on how much litigation costs in a typical case. Reputable sources
provide numbers that may seem surprisingly low—for example, $20,000 for a
single party2—or surprisingly high, to the tune of millions of dollars.3 As
another example of the uncertainty, there is anecdotal evidence that many
companies fear spoliation sanctions arising out of unclear preservation
obligations; yet there is also evidence that the imposition of sanctions is rare.4
As a recent report has noted, the “actual costs of discovery have rarely been
quantified in empirical studies.”5
This collective ignorance of judges, policymakers, and academics feeds
uncertainty at both the policy and the doctrinal level. Policymaking, in the sense
of rules design, is hamstrung by a lack of information about the activities that
are the subject of the rules. While there is no shortage of anecdotes decrying
excessive costs and burdens of discovery (usually from the defense bar) and
alarm about stonewalling and evidence destruction (usually from the plaintiffs’
bar),6 it is hard to judge the extent of these problems or what, if anything, should
be done about them.
Ignorance of how discovery tends to play out in practice leads to confusion
even at a doctrinal level. The federal courts appear ambivalent about how to
address perceived problems with discovery, despite discovery being the subject

2. A Federal Judicial Center study reports that the median discovery costs for defendants in
civil cases in federal court are $20,000. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, National, CaseBased Civil Rules Survey, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 2 (2009) [hereinafter Civil Rules Survey].
3. A study by the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System (IAALS)
estimates discovery costs of $3.5 million for a “midsize” case. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
THE AM. LEGAL SYS., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: A VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES 4 (2008).
4. EMERY G. LEE III, MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS BASED UPON SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE IN
CIVIL CASES: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 3‒
5 (FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 2011).
5. Nicholas M. Pace & Laura Zakaras, Where the Money Goes: Understanding Litigant
Expenditures for Producing Electronic Discovery, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE 4 (2012)
[hereinafter Where the Money Goes]. See also id. at 3 (“A repeated lament in the academic and
legal literature is that there has been little or no research into the costs imposed on the larger judicial
system by the discovery process.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The reasons for this are
manifold. See infra Part II.A. See also Where the Money Goes, supra, at 4 (listing various reasons,
including: “[i]nformation about pretrial expenditures is almost always in the exclusive control of
litigants and their attorneys”; “[r]esearchers must collect data from multiple sources”; “[i]t may be
time-consuming or costly for litigants and their attorneys to retrieve relevant data about discoveryrelated costs”; “[s]taff in corporate departments, such as those in legal and information technology
(IT), are unlikely to track their own litigation-related time expenditures”; and “[m]ost importantly,
organizations may be reluctant to share information about their legal expenditures”).
6. See, e.g., LEE III, supra note 4, at 7.
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of an entire set of rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules).7 For
example, the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,8 the seminal case in
the paradigm of plausibility pleading, famously fretted about the costs of
discovery in antitrust litigation but made no use of the Rules governing
discovery.9
Today, the most salient discovery-related issue among practitioners is
“preservation”: the duty to preserve relevant documents and electronically
stored information (ESI)10 when litigation is reasonably anticipated. However,
the Rules do not make clear that preservation is within the scope of discovery—
or for that matter, within the scope of federal procedural lawmaking power at
all. The Rules assiduously avoid any mention of the preservation of documents
in anticipation of litigation, presumably to avoid concerns that such rules would
tread upon state-created substantive law causes of action for spoliation of
evidence. Yet over the past decade the lower federal courts have treated the
silence of the Rules as an invitation to create a federal common law of
preservation and spoliation.11 This common law of preservation and spoliation
has addressed a need for judicial policing of spoliation of ESI. However, it has
done so while also engendering considerable dissention among the courts
themselves12 and causing rancorous complaints from litigants about what they
claim are the severe burdens of the legal obligations imposed by the case law on
preservation.13
The need for better information about preservation and discovery has never
been greater. The Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee has recently
responded to the doctrinal chaos with proposed amendments addressing, among
other things, preservation and discovery of documents and ESI in federal
7. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37.
8. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
9. Id. at 558.
10. See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Preservation Obligation: Regulating and Sanctioning Prelitigation Spoilation in Federal Court, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2005, 2006‒07 (2011). This article
will use “data,” “documents,” and “information” interchangeably to refer to both paper records and
ESI.
11. Id. at 2005‒07.
12. As a recent study noted:
Examples of conflicting holdings across and within jurisdictions include issues related to
whether failure to issue a written legal-hold notice constitutes gross negligence per se,
what preservation-related duties exist regarding potentially relevant evidence in the
hands of third parties, whether a proportionality standard should be applied in deciding
what information to retain, whether spoliation sanctions require a showing of negligence
or a more stringent bad-faith standard, or whether sanctions should be imposed for the
failure to properly preserve data without any need to show that the lost information was
relevant or helpful to the requesting party.
Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at 93 (footnotes omitted).
13. See, e.g., LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., PRESERVATION—MOVING THE
PARADIGM 4 (2010); DISCOVERY SUBCOMM., ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MINICONFERENCE ON PRESERVATION AND SANCTIONS 19‒20 (2011).
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litigation.14 This activity comes amid widespread calls for rules reform arising
out of frustration with the patchwork of case law that currently governs
preservation and sanctions for spoliation in federal court litigation.15 While
there has been considerable debate about the merits of various proposals to
amend the Rules, there is consensus on the need for further empirical research
on the magnitude and nature of the costs associated with civil litigation,
including the costs of discovery and preservation.
The growing awareness of the need for empirical data on the benefits and
burdens of procedural rules has led to increasingly ambitious efforts to study
certain aspects of the costs of civil litigation. These include the Civil Rules
Survey by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC),16 the Member Survey on Civil
Practice by the ABA Section of Litigation,17 and the Litigation Cost Survey of
Major Companies.18 These studies provide essentially no discussion, however,
of the cost of preservation, despite its centrality to debates about the costs of
discovery and the need for Rules reform.19 The only prior, serious study of
preservation costs was limited to in-depth, qualitative interviews with eight
companies.20
Prior to the work presented herein, no research had ever gathered quantitative
data on preservation costs from a large sample of litigants.21 This article seeks
to shed some light on the layers of uncertainty in and about the process of
discovery. The parts that follow present new research results, propose new
stylized facts about discovery, and tease out their implications for legal practice
and Rules reform.

14. See Oliver H. Barber III, Upcoming Changes to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Modernizing Scope of Discovery and Clarifying Consequences of Failure to Preserve, LOUISVILLE
B. ASS’N’S BRIEFS (Sept. 2014), http://www.stites.com/learning-center/articles/upcomingchanges-to-federal-rules-of-civil-procedure-modernizing-scope. Absent action by Congress to
block the amendments, the amendments will take effect December 1, 2015.
15. See Spencer, supra note 10, at 2034.
16. See generally Civil Rules Survey, supra note 2.
17. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE:
FULL REPORT § 11 (2009) [herein after ABA STUDY].
18. See generally LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR
COMPANIES (2010) [hereinafter LITIGATION COST SURVEY].
19. See ABA STUDY, supra note 17, at 2; Civil Rules Survey, supra note 2, at 1. One reason
for this is that prior studies have been surveys of outside counsel. The costs of preservation
activities tend to be borne directly by the client, rather than outside counsel, and often begin before
a lawsuit is filed. See William H.J. Hubbard, Preservation Costs Survey Final Report (Feb. 18,
2014), http://www.regulations.gov (search by ID number: USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-2201)
[hereinafter Preservation Costs Survey Report].
20. Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at iii, 15 (“Our approach here was qualitative in
nature because it was clear that gauging the magnitude of preservation expenses in individual cases
would present some daunting hurdles.”).
21. Id. at 86 (“Despite the costs of preservation having become one of the most discussed
topics in the legal press of late, we are not aware of any empirical research that has collected
quantitative information about such costs across significant numbers of actual cases.”).
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Part I briefly summarizes Rules and case law governing preservation
obligations in federal civil litigation. Part II describes original, empirical
research conducted on the costs of preservation and discovery. This study,
referred to as the Preservation Costs Survey (Survey), is the first—and to date
the only—systematic effort to measure the extent and costs of preservation
activity across a cross-section of companies. Although focused on preservation
costs, this Survey collected quantitative data on the volume, timing, and cost of
other aspects of discovery, particularly those aspects of discovery farthest
removed from court oversight (i.e., collection and processing, as opposed to
review and production). It is also unique among quantitative studies in that it
focuses on the costs of the client’s own discovery-related activities rather than
the costs incurred by outside counsel retained to litigate cases.
The Survey responded to a call from the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
for empirical data on the costs of preservation.22 The Survey was supported by
an industry organization called the Civil Justice Reform Group, whose members
include large companies concerned with the costs of preservation but, tellingly,
could not quantify their own preservation costs.23 The Survey collected
information from 128 companies and gathered detailed, case-level data on
preservation activity in over 3,600 separate litigation matters. Surveyed
companies ranged from small companies without in-house litigation counsel to
Fortune 100 companies who have entire staffs of attorneys and other
professionals devoted full-time to compliance with litigation-related
preservation obligations.
Part III presents key findings from the research conducted and proposes three
new stylized facts about preservation and discovery, complete with three
accompanying metaphors: the discovery sombrero, the preservation iceberg,
and the long tail of costs. The usual progression of discovery activities in a given
case begins with the preservation of information that may be relevant to ongoing
or threatened litigation. Next comes the collection of documents for processing
and review. Processing refers to actions such as decryption, decompression, and
de-duplication of documents to render them amenable to review and to reduce
redundancies and other unnecessary costs further downstream. Review is the
work lawyers conduct to determine relevance and privilege of the documents in
discovery. Production is the process of turning over to opposing counsel the
relevant, non-privileged materials within the scope of discovery.
Obvious quantitative questions immediately arise: how much of what is
preserved is collected? How much of what is collected is processed? One might
imagine a winnowing process whereby the parties begin with a large set of
22. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19. Earlier drafts of portions of this
article were shared with the Advisory Committee.
23. As noted in the Preservation Costs Survey Report submitted to the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, “The Civil Justice Reform Group describes itself as an organization formed and
directed by general counsel of Fortune 100 Companies concerned about America’s justice system.”
Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 6 n.10.
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documents that are preserved, which they gradually trim down to the materials
most relevant to settlement, summary judgment, or trial, as in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1: THE STAGES OF DISCOVERY

Production
Review

Processing

Collection

Preservation

This Survey, however, indicates a different relationship between the volumes
of data involved in preservation relative to the other stages. The progression is
not so much a discovery pyramid as it is a discovery sombrero, introduced in
Part III.A and shown below.
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FIGURE 2: THE DISCOVERY SOMBRERO
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Collection
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The immediate implication of this fact is that preservation—a stage of
discovery that to date has gone unmentioned in the Rules and is remote from
judicial oversight—has the potential to be a source of substantial costs in the
civil justice system.
Part III.B introduces the “preservation iceberg,” which begins to unpack
exactly how and where the huge data volumes being preserved for civil litigation
impose costs on preserving parties. Debates about the costs of preservation and
the need for Rules reform tend to be framed by anecdotes about what this article
refers to as the “fixed costs” of preservation. An example of a “fixed cost” is
the million dollars a large company spends on a computer system to facilitate
the preservation of ESI. Given the obvious self-interest of the parties offering
such anecdotes, one might wonder whether such anecdotes exaggerate the costs
of preservation.
Perhaps the most surprising finding of this research is that such anecdotes
severely underestimate the total costs of preservation activity. While a Fortune
500 company might spend $4 million on computer systems, it is merely the “tip
of the iceberg” of preservation costs, and, as with icebergs, the tip is a mere ten
percent of the whole. Anecdotes about these costing $4 million likely reflect
real, but invisible, costs closer to $40 million.
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Why have the true costs of preservation evaded observation? Some costs,
such as the invoice for a new computer application, are easy to observe. But this
study reveals that the greatest cost of preservation activity is not the price tag of
new technology, but the human cost in employee time diverted from business
activities to litigation-related activities. The costs associated with this diversion
of human effort constitute over ninety percent of total preservation costs in the
largest companies and essentially 100 percent of total preservation costs in
smaller companies.
Part III.C introduces the “long tail of costs,” a phenomenon that can
harmonize the seemingly irreconcilable data and anecdotes that populate the
rhetoric of procedural reform: on the one hand, there are documented accounts
of preservation and discovery costing millions of dollars in cases that companies
regularly litigate; and on the other hand, there are data showing that median costs
are measured in the thousands, not millions, of dollars.
Both accounts are true: the distribution of preservation costs is such that most
litigation matters involve moderate costs, but the distribution is highly skewed,
with a long but thin tail of extremely expensive litigation matters. The skew is
so great that even though cases with blockbuster costs are rare—maybe five
percent of all litigation matters—they account for the majority of all costs.
Interestingly, the data collected in this article on companies’ preservation costs
is strikingly consistent with previous data collected on outside counsels’
litigation costs, which suggests that this “long tail of costs” reflects a deep
phenomenon affecting all of litigation.
Part IV discusses the relevance of the discovery sombrero, the preservation
iceberg, and the long tail of litigation costs to policymaking and legal doctrine
governing discovery. While the first objective of this article is to introduce key,
stylized facts on preservation and discovery, which are relevant to many
questions in this field, the second objective is to explore how these stylized facts
help identify the way forward in addressing three specific cleavages in the law.
First, the discovery sombrero interacts in a surprising way with Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins24 and its progeny. Current federal efforts to regulate
preservation through federal common law need to account for the fact that much
of what is regulated occurs outside the context of federal litigation. For example,
federal rules governing the conduct of preservation direct the behavior of parties
who will ultimately find themselves in state, not federal, court. This raises the
specter of Erie. Although objections have been raised against a federal rule on
preservation because of Rules Enabling Act concerns, these concerns are
precisely backwards. If anything, federal rulemaking solves, rather than raises,
an Erie infirmity.
Second, the preservation iceberg interacts in an unexpected way with debates
about the choice between reliance on legal reform and reliance on technological
innovation to reduce costs associated with discovery. Big businesses have
24. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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claimed that legal change is needed to control costs that have multiplied due to
technological change, while their opponents have argued that technology can
also lower preservation and discovery costs.25 The research presented herein
suggests that both of these arguments are misdirected. Preservation costs are
very high—indeed, even higher than proponents of legal reform have
recognized—but most of the costs are human costs, rather than technology costs.
Further, technology is not a substitute for legal reform because technological
solutions are practical only for the largest companies where high-tech solutions
justify their high price tag. For smaller companies—and in this study, “smaller”
includes companies with under 1,000 employees—technology plays a much
smaller role in the preservation process. From this point of view, legal
innovation, rather than technological innovation, may be the best hope for
controlling preservation costs of individuals, small businesses, and virtually
everyone other than the largest and most sophisticated litigants.
Third, the stark differences among cases involving different substantive
fields—compare the typical scope of discovery in an antitrust case versus an
employment discrimination case, or compare the information asymmetries in
those cases with those in, say, contract cases—put constant pressure on the
transsubstantive design of the Rules. The long tail of costs, however, points the
way to a Rules-based approach to controlling discovery that does not require the
Rules to abandon a commitment to transsubstantive standards. Given that most
preservation and discovery costs are concentrated in a small share of cases, one
can structure the Rules to set presumptive limits on discovery that leave most
cases unaffected but facilitate party bargaining and judicial oversight in the
fraction of cases where the issue of cost control may deserve careful attention.
I. LAW GOVERNING PRESERVATION AND DISCOVERY
The Rules do not explicitly address preservation. The Rules do, however,
provide the framework for addressing discovery generally. For example, Rule
1 dictates that the Rules “should be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”26
Rule 26(b)(1) outlines the scope of discovery: “[p]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense.”27 Rule 26(b)(2) sets out the limits of permissible discovery.28 In
particular, Rule 26(b)(2)(C) outlines the bases for limiting discovery and
imposes a mandatory requirement on courts to limit discovery, even sua sponte,
if “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely

25. See ABA STUDY, supra note 17, at 110 (finding that defense counsels were less optimistic
about technological advances improving cost efficiency than were plaintiffs’ lawyers).
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
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benefit.”29 In this way, Rule “26(b)(2)(C) cautions that all permissible discovery
must be measured against the yardstick of proportionality.”30
While it appears these Rules present a set of guidelines for discovery that
might arguably apply to preservation, these Rules have been by all accounts
ineffective at providing meaningful guidance to courts and litigants on questions
of preservation.31 Federal case law on preservation has largely ignored the Rules
and has done little to settle the question of what needs to be preserved and by
what standards a failure to preserve will be judged. In fact, courts do not even
agree on “whether a proportionality standard should be applied in deciding what
information to retain.”32 In Pippins v. KPMG LLP,33 the court found the
proportionality standard too “amorphous” to be useful and instead concluded
that “[u]ntil a more precise definition is created by rule, prudence favors
retaining all relevant materials.”34
Of course, a few principles governing preservation are fairly well-settled. For
example, the duty to preserve relevant data attaches when a party reasonably
anticipates litigation.35 Failure to take appropriate steps to preserve data can
subject a party to sanctions, which a federal court may impose under its inherent
power.36
One key step—perhaps the key step—in complying with the duty to preserve
is the issuance of a litigation hold. A “litigation hold” is a set of actions taken
by a company to comply with preservation obligations in a litigation matter.37
A litigation hold will define the scope of documents and data that must be
preserved.38 A “litigation-hold notice” is an instruction from legal counsel to an
employee that the employee must retain all documents and data in her custody
that are within the scope of the litigation hold; for example, in a products liability
case, the scope might be all documents relating to the safety of a particular

29. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
30. Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 523 (D. Md. 2010).
31. See DISCOVERY SUBCOMM., supra note 13, at 2‒3; see also LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE
ET AL., supra note 13, at 11 (noting that “only two courts have considered the application of
proportionality to the scope of preservation pursuant to FRCP Rule 26(b)(2)(C) although neither
court specifically analyzed its application”).
32. Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at 93 (citations omitted).
33. No. 11 Civ. 0377(CM)(JLC), 2011 WL 4701849, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011).
34. Id. at 6 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
35. See, e.g., Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Sec.,
LLC, 685 F.Supp.2d 456, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Surowiec v. Capital Title Agency, Inc., 790
F.Supp.2d 997, 1005 (D. Ariz. 2011) (“It is well established that the duty to preserve arises when
a party knows or should know that certain evidence is relevant to pending or future litigation.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Surowiec, 790 F.Supp.2d at 1008.
37. Stephanie F. Stacy, Litigation Holds: Ten Tips in Ten Minutes, http://www.ned.uscourts.
gov/internetDocs/cle/2010-07/LitigationHoldTopTen.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2015).
38. Id.
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product that the company produces.39 The usual practice is to send a litigationhold notice to the set of “key players” who are likely to have data relevant to the
dispute in question.40 As described below in Part II, one primary measure of
preservation activity is the number of litigation-hold notices issued.
However, many questions regarding preservation remain unsettled. Courts
have diverged on questions such as “whether failure to issue a written legal-hold
notice constitutes gross negligence per se”41 and “what preservation-related
duties exist regarding potentially relevant evidence in the hands of third
parties.”42 Most notably, courts have not even converged on a standard for the
two essential prerequisites for imposing spoliation sanctions: the alleged
spoliator’s state of mind and prejudice to the other party.
As to the former, most courts require bad faith—in the form of intentional
destruction of data to prevent its use in litigation—before imposing serious
sanctions such as entering judgment against the offending party or giving an
adverse inference instruction to the jury.43 But some courts explicitly disclaim
any requirement of bad faith.44 Further, some courts are willing to infer
negligence from the mere fact that any data whatsoever was lost.45 This split is
complicated by the idiosyncratic terminology applied by some courts that
distinguish between “willfulness” and bad faith, such that a merely volitional
act—such as good faith deletion of data without awareness of its potential
relevance to litigation—is “willful” spoliation.46 As for the standard for finding
prejudice, some courts will presume relevance and prejudice from gross

39. Id.
40. See id.
41. Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at 93 (citations omitted).
42. Id. (citation omitted).
43. See, e.g., Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F.Supp.2d 598, 607, 653 (S.D.
Tex. 2010) (imposing sanctions including an adverse inference instruction against defendants that
intentionally deleted emails after a duty to preserve had arisen).
44. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding
that negligent spoliation is sufficient to incur sanctions).
45. See id. (“Once the duty to preserve attaches, any destruction of documents is, at a
minimum, negligent.”). For example, in Pension Committee v. Banc of America Securities, LLC,
a party had failed to produce a number of emails that were later discovered in another production.
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The court stated that, “[t]his, alone, demonstrates
that the [party’s] effort to find and produce all relevant documents was insufficient.” Id. at 489.
See Michael W. Deyo, Deconstructing Pension Committee: The Evolving Rules of Evidence
Spoliation and Sanctions in the Electronic Discovery Era, 75 ALB. L. REV. 305 (2011/2012)
(discussing Pension Committee in detail). See Surowiec v. Capital Title Agency, Inc., 790
F.Supp.2d 997, 1007 (D. Ariz. 2011) (rejecting this approach as “too inflexible”).
46. See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 194 (D.S.C. 2008) (holding that if the
spoliation is “willful” adverse inference instructions are appropriate “even in the absence of bad
faith,” and that sanctions of dismissal and default judgment require a showing of “bad faith”).
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negligence or bad faith,47 while others will make such an inference only from
bad faith,48 or perhaps not at all.49
II. THE PRESERVATION COSTS SURVEY
The Preservation Costs Survey is the first systematic, quantitative study of
preservation costs across a spectrum of companies that are engaged in
preservation activities. Part II.A discusses the key constraints that drove the
design of the Survey. Prior to this study, these factors had combined to prevent
any systematic collection of preservation costs. Part II.B describes the Survey
methodology, and Part II.C describes the sampled companies.50
A. Obstacles to Empirical Work on Preservation
In order to measure the costs associated with preservation obligations, this
Survey had to overcome a number of challenges that prevented prior research
from determining the nature and scale of preservation costs.51 Indeed, a
prerequisite to gathering any quantitative data was identifying which costs of
preservation are even susceptible to practical measurement. Thus, the first phase
of the survey design focused on in-depth interviews with personnel at a pilot
group of companies. These interviews sought to identify which aspects of the
costs of preservation are most amenable to study and which would be difficult,
or as a practical matter impossible, to estimate. Not surprisingly, every company

47. Pension Comm., 685 F.Supp.2d at 467 (“Relevance and prejudice may be presumed when
the spoliating party acted in bad faith or in a grossly negligent manner.”).
48. See, e.g., D’Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp., Inc., No. 06-687(JDB/JMF), 2010 WL 3324964,
at *10 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2010). The court held:
When a party, for example, has acted negligently and lost evidence, [an adverse]
inference does not flow naturally from the facts. When a person purposefully destroys
evidence, it is reasonable to infer that he did so to keep it from being used against him
. . . . [When the action was negligent or reckless,] a court cannot logically infer the intent
of what a party did from its behavior because its behavior was unthinking.
Id.
49. Orbit One Commc’ns v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding
that before addressing culpability “a court considering a sanctions motion must make a threshold
determination whether any material that has been destroyed was likely relevant even for purposes
of discovery”).
50. As noted above, earlier versions of portions of this article were submitted as a public
comment to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in the form of the Preservation Costs Survey
Report. The Preservation Costs Survey Report contains details on a number of Survey results not
discussed in this article. This article develops doctrinal and prescriptive analysis that was beyond
the scope of the Report submitted to the Advisory Committee. The discussion of the background
and methodology of the Survey, however, is largely unchanged in this article from the earlier
version in the Report, although in some places, the Report goes into more detail on the finer points
of the methodology and data. For this reason, the article will include notes directing the reader to
relevant portions of the Preservation Costs Survey Report that contain details related to the
discussion in the text herein.
51. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 9‒13.
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interviewed for the Survey expressed that estimating the costs of preservation is
difficult.52
There are several reasons for this difficulty. First, identifying systems and
their cost requires time-consuming, individualized investigation of each
company.53 Each company has different computer systems, different internal
business flow, and different technology needs. While an “off-the-shelf” solution
from an outside vendor comes with an invoiced price, the full cost of that
solution includes company time and resources for project bidding,
implementation, and maintenance over time. Systems that are developed inhouse are even harder to price.
Second, individualized investigation is required to ensure that the costs being
measured are properly attributable to preservation obligations, rather than other
motivations. To address this concern, the author relied on detailed, in-depth
interviews with companies to accurately identify specific systems whose sole
purpose was compliance with preservation obligations. As a consequence of
this approach, the Survey data on these costs generates a conservative estimate
of the total costs of technologies adopted in response to preservation burdens.
Third, the human cost of preservation-related activity in terms of lost work
time has never before been measured. One major cost of preservation
obligations is the lost employee time spent complying with duties imposed
through the issuance of litigation-hold notices. Because the cost of compliance
with litigation-hold notices is dispersed throughout a company, and because the
cost primarily takes the form of lost time rather than monetary payments,
measuring the magnitude of this cost is difficult.54 The time and energy that
employees must divert towards preservation is never recorded or compensated,
unlike the time spent by dedicated lawyers, such as outside counsel.55
The strategy to measure these costs was to collect detailed information on the
number of matters with litigation holds and the number of employees subject to
each litigation hold at a sample of companies. The author combined these counts
of employees subject to litigation holds with estimates of time lost per employee
and the hourly cost of employee time, to quantify in dollar terms the value of
employee time that is diverted from business purposes to compliance with
preservation obligations.
52. See also Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at xix (“Most interviewees did not hesitate
to confess that their preservation costs had not been systematically tracked in any way and that they
were unclear as to how such tracking might be accomplished.”).
53. Id. at 85.
54. See id. at xviii.
55. See id. at 85.
Part of the reason for a lack of existing information in this area appears to be that much
of preservation involves expenditures incurred internally, such as the costs of IT staff
time, law department attorney and paralegal time, other employees’ time (such as the
effort required of custodians to comply with legal-hold notices), and purchases and
licensing of applications and hardware to handle preservation.
Id.
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Fourth, companies are unable or reluctant to share sensitive and confidential
information about litigation-related costs.56 In many cases, companies simply
do not have the information or cannot gather it at reasonable cost.57 This
reluctance is also due to companies’ concern that disclosing information about
their litigation experiences and expenses could be used strategically against them
in litigation.58 For this reason, all information collected for the Preservation
Costs Survey was gathered subject to assurances of strict confidentiality and
anonymity for each survey participant.59
Fifth, many costs associated with preservation are diffuse and cannot be
directly measured. For example, while the lost time of affected employees can
be measured, other costs remain unmeasured, such as delays in basic business
processes like rolling out new computers to employees due to concerns about
the preservation of data stored on due-to-be-retired hard drives.60 Thus, the
preservation costs measured by the Survey do not exhaust the universe of costs
imposed by preservation obligations.
B. Survey Methodology
The Survey involved three phases, lasting from late 2011 through early
2014.61 The Survey was done with the support and assistance of the Civil Justice
Reform Group (CJRG), a group of in-house counsel at large, U.S. corporations.62
CJRG asked a number of large companies to participate in the Survey and
coordinated with other business associations (including small and medium-sized
businesses) to request that their members participate in the Survey. This
provided unprecedented access to information about companies’ experiences
with preservation and discovery; as noted above, it is usually impossible to
56. See id. at 4.
57. Only fourteen percent of Survey respondents stated that they track the costs of their
litigation holds. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 12 n.18.
58. See Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at 4.
59. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 13 (explaining further the steps
to protect anonymity and data integrity). For example, in some cases, exact numbers are rounded
or topcoded (e.g., employee counts larger than 100,000 are reported as “> 100,000”) to protect
anonymity. Id.
60. Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at 86. The report explained:
[T]here may be economic impacts resulting from a decision not to adopt certain IT
products (such as instant messaging or social-networking platforms) that might present
significant difficulties when preserving information, from not implementing moreefficient data systems due to the need to maintain older legacy platforms and processes,
from slower computer-system performance caused by halting the routine deletion of
obsolete information in transactional databases, or from a reduced ability to recover lost
but nevertheless important data due to a shift from a long-term data backup process to a
short-term disaster-recovery system primarily because of preservation concerns.
Id.
61. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 13‒16 (discussing details on the
Survey methodology).
62. Id. at 6 n.10.
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collect information on litigation-related costs from companies. Indeed, even
with CJRG helping to convince companies to participate, a major component of
survey design and promotion was to provide detailed, credible assurances of
confidentiality and anonymity to respondents.
While the sponsorship of CJRG was essential to the viability of this project,
there is no question that CJRG is an advocacy organization, and the author was
compensated for his time and expenses associated with designing the survey,
interviewing respondents, and processing response data.63 Because of this, the
methodology involved steps taken to protect the independence of the research
and insulate the survey results from any outside influence. CJRG agreed not to
participate in the design of the survey questions or access the data collected in
the course of the survey. Nor was CJRG involved in the analysis of the data.
Further, CJRG retained no interest in or oversight of the use or publication of
results in this article. Thus, to be absolutely clear, all of the arguments and
conclusions herein are the author’s alone.
Given the complexity of the topic, and the largely unprecedented nature of a
study focused on preservation costs, the Survey utilized a three-phase design.
Phase I involved a set of four, in-depth case studies of large companies. These
case studies involved both qualitative interviews and requests for quantitative
data to be used for statistical analysis. One important aspect of Phase I was
developing the survey instrument. The development process began with an
extensive written survey coupled with follow-up interviews to obtain feedback
on the clarity and practicability of each question. This information was used to
draft the survey instruments used with larger samples of companies during
Phases II and III.
Phase II broadened the sample of companies to thirteen and continued to
employ an in-depth, case-study approach. A revised questionnaire was
combined with interviews and the collection of matter-level datasets of
preservation activity in order to create as complete as possible a picture of the
sources and amounts of preservation costs for large companies. As used in this
article, “matter-level datasets” are datasets in which information on the number
of litigation holds is provided for each individual litigation matter. Often, a
“matter” is a lawsuit, but not always. Litigation matters include both filed and
anticipated lawsuits. For this reason, this article uses the term “matter” rather
than “case.” In addition to survey and interview responses, Phase II yielded six
unique databases of matter- and employee-level preservation activity within
specific companies. These databases of preservation activity were provided on
a strictly confidential, anonymous basis. These datasets together provided
information on over 3,600 separate litigation matters involving over 770,000
63. As noted above, CJRG’s interest in sponsoring this research was to respond to calls for
empirical data on preservation costs from members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, who
were considering proposals to amend the Rules to address preservation. The Preservation Costs
Survey Report took no position on specific proposals, but did conclude that preservation costs were
large enough to merit attention from the rulemakers. Id. at 47.
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litigation hold notices issued to individual employees in individual matters.
They are the first large samples of case-specific preservation activity data ever
compiled for research purposes.
Phase III involved a shortened survey questionnaire and no interviews or
requests for data. This Phase was deliberately designed to be distributed to a
larger number of companies, which would allow them to respond with a much
smaller investment in human resources. The goal of Phase III was to obtain
survey responses from a large sample of companies, including small and
medium-sized businesses, in order to draw inferences about preservation activity
in a broader cross-section of civil litigants. Phase III was publicized to
companies through groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers,
Lawyers for Civil Justice, and the Association of Corporate Counsel. The
surveys could be completed on a printable form or by an online survey
instrument hosted on research.net. The Phase III survey was open from October
2013 to January 2014.64 By the conclusion of Phase III, a total of 128 unique
companies had completed survey questionnaires.65
Although this study is by far the most rigorous survey of preservation costs
ever conducted, this study’s methodology, by its very nature, cannot guarantee
a representative sample of all companies with preservation obligations.66 As
with any survey, this study could include only those who were willing and able
to respond. Nonetheless, the Survey results provide several indications that the
sample may be representative of the larger population of companies.
First, the results from each phase of the Survey are remarkably consistent with
each other, despite substantial differences in the process by which companies
were solicited for participation and the degree of effort required by the
companies to complete their participation. This suggests that the amount of
effort required to participate is not strongly correlated with the characteristics of
the company.
Second, many of the patterns that one would predict to see in the data based
on strong a priori justifications do, in fact, appear in the data. For example,
smaller companies have very few (often zero) litigation attorneys and report

64. Two surveys were returned in February 2014. They are included in the results reported
below. Excluding them has little effect on the reported results. See id. at 15 n.21.
65. The Phase III questionnaire is reproduced in the Appendix of the Preservation Costs
Survey Report. See id. at 55‒59.
66. Compare Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at xiii–xiv (“We asked participants to
choose a minimum of five cases in which they produced data and electronic documents to another
party as part of an e-discovery request. . . . Because the participating companies and cases do not
constitute a representative sample of corporations and litigation, we cannot draw generalizations
from our findings that apply to all corporate litigants or all discovery productions.”), with
Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 6 (“The Survey ultimately collected
information from 128 companies from a wide spectrum of industries. These companies vary from
small companies without in-house litigation counsel to Fortune 100 companies who have entire
staffs of attorneys and other professionals devoted full-time to preservation work.”).
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dramatically fewer active cases.67 This pattern might not emerge if only the
most sophisticated (or most embroiled in litigation) smaller companies
participated in the Survey.
Third, unlike prior studies that also depended on the willingness of companies
to provide data on discovery costs (Litigation Cost Survey) or to provide
interview responses on preservation (Where the Money Goes), the Preservation
Costs Survey did not allow participating companies to select specific cases for
inclusion in the sample. Rather, the questionnaire asked only for information
about cases in the aggregate, and the requests for databases of preservation
activity included all litigation matters with litigation holds (excluding asbestos
matters). Thus, the Preservation Costs Survey provides analysis of the first truly
representative samples of the within-company distribution of litigation activity.
C. Sample Characteristics
The 128 survey respondents represent a broad cross-section of companies in
the United States.68 The participating companies come from a wide variety of
industries.69 The most heavily represented categories were health care,
insurance, technology, and conglomerate, each with at least ten respondents.
The number of people employed worldwide by each company ranges from 18
to over 100,000.70 Importantly, although large companies were the focus of
Phases I and II, smaller companies are well represented in the sample. About a
quarter of all respondents (twenty-four percent) have 1,000 or fewer employees
worldwide; the same proportion have 500 or fewer U.S. employees, the
threshold usually used to define a small or medium-sized enterprise (SME).71
The largest companies, those with over 100,000 employees worldwide, make up
about one-sixth (sixteen percent) of the sample.72

67. See infra note 94.
68. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 17‒19 (discussing the survey
respondents and data collected in further detail).
69. The categories are: Automobiles & Parts, Banks, Chemicals, Conglomerate, Financial
Services, Food & Beverage, Health Care, Industrial Goods & Services, Insurance, Media, Oil &
Gas, Other, Personal & Household Goods, Retail, Technology, Telecommunications, Travel &
Leisure, and Utilities.
70. In order to protect the anonymity of some respondents, exact employee counts above
100,000 are not reported.
71. This article refers to companies with 1,000 or fewer employees as “smaller companies.”
72. Herein, the author will occasionally refer to companies with close to or more than 100,000
employees worldwide as “large companies.” Companies with 1,001–10,000 employees made up
twenty-nine percent of the sample; companies with 10,001–100,000 employees made up thirty
percent of the sample.
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TABLE 1: SURVEY DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Panel A: Employees, Lawsuits, and Litigation Hold Matters
Mean

Median

Min

Total employees

43,454

8,000

18

> 100,000

U.S. employees

21,678

6,100

0

> 100,000

12

4

0

> 50

1,399

33

0

> 10,000

686

33

0

> 10,000

In-house litigation attorneys
Active suits
Open matters with holds

Max

Panel B: Share with Preservation Resources or Practices
Issues litigation holds notices

100%

Has formal preservation policies

84%

Tracks litigation holds and notices

63%

Has e-discovery team

40%

Has legal IT group

31%

The volume of litigation varies widely across these companies; the number of
suits currently active varies from 0 to over 10,000.73 Asbestos litigation was
specifically excluded from the Survey.74 There is also great variation in the
number of litigation holds that companies report as active.75 The number of in-

73. In order to protect the anonymity of some respondents, exact counts of lawsuits and
litigation holds above 10,000 are not reported. Five companies did not report numbers of suits, and
seven companies did not report numbers of matters with holds.
74. While asbestos litigation remains an important part of the federal civil docket, it is sui
generis with respect to preservation; at this point in the history of asbestos litigation, virtually every
document in the possession of a company defendant that could possibly be relevant to asbestos
claims has long ago been preserved and produced.
75. As the duty to preserve may arise before a lawsuit is filed, the number of matters subject
to litigation holds may be greater than the number of lawsuits. Conversely, a single litigation hold
may suffice for a number of related lawsuits, and thus a company may have fewer litigation holds
than lawsuits.
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house litigation attorneys ranges from zero to over fifty.76 Most in-house
litigation teams are small—the median is four, and seventeen out of the 128
companies have no in-house litigation counsel. See Table 1.77
Some basic Survey results are unsurprising.78 Consistent with the great
weight of anecdotal evidence and prior qualitative studies, surveyed companies
generally reported significant preservation burdens, although some reported
little or none at all.79 In interviews, companies expressed that they are
deliberately “overinclusive” or “overpreserve” to protect themselves against the
great uncertainty associated with the current law of preservation.80 Government
investigations, rather than private lawsuits, ranked first in terms of preservationrelated problems. This is unsurprising, given the often sweeping scope and
indefinite duration of government investigations, which may entail incredibly
broad requests for information.
III. THREE STYLIZED FACTS ABOUT LITIGATION
A. The Discovery Sombrero
Perhaps the most basic finding of the Survey was that most respondents did
not know the extent of their preservation activity or what fraction of data that is
put on litigation hold is ever collected, let alone reviewed or used, in the course
of discovery. Those that did reported on average that perhaps half (fifty-one
percent) of all data that is preserved is never processed and reviewed.81 This
result is consistent with a recent survey by an e-discovery vendor, which found
that for most companies, legal holds proceed to collection less than half the
time.82
For larger companies, the drop-off from preservation to collection,
processing, and review is even steeper. Figure 3 presents data from a large
company on the number of custodians involved in three stages of discovery:
76. In order to protect the anonymity of some respondents, exact counts of litigation attorneys
above fifty are not reported. Three companies did not report the number of litigation attorneys.
77. For Total Employees and U.S. Employees, N = 126. Median numbers of employees are
rounded by up to one percent to protect respondent anonymity.
78. In addition to the details noted here, the Preservation Costs Survey Report provides many
additional results. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 20‒43.
79. See id. at 20‒21 (finding that over seventy-nine percent (102 of 128) of respondents
reported a “great extent” or “moderate extent” of burdens from preservation activity.). See also
Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at xix (“All interviewees reported that preservation had
evolved into a significant portion of their companies’ total e-discovery expenditures.”).
80. Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 46. See also Where the Money Goes,
supra note 5, at 92 (“If there was one consistent theme in what we heard, it revolved around
complaints of a lack of understandable legal authority and guidance that could be comfortably relied
on when making preservation decisions.”).
81. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 43‒44.
82. LEGAL HOLD AND DATA PRESERVATION BENCHMARK SURVEY 2013 16 (2013) (finding
that for “64 percent of respondents, legal holds progress to collection less than half the time”).
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preservation, collection, and processing. Out of over 5,000 custodians placed
on litigation hold, and thus subject to preservation obligations, fewer than ten
percent ultimately see their data collected, let alone processed.
FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF CUSTODIANS SUBJECT TO PRESERVATION,
COLLECTION, AND PROCESSING OF AN ANONYMOUS LARGE COMPANY
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Figure 4 presents a similar picture with non-anonymous data provided in
public testimony on behalf of Microsoft. In Figure 4, the unit of measurement
is the quantity of data preserved, collected, and processed rather than the number
of custodians subject to those activities. The Microsoft data also illustrates how
little data, relative to the quantity preserved, is ever used in litigation.83 From
this, the shape of the discovery sombrero, illustrated above in Figure 2, is
apparent: a wide “brim” of preservation, and a much narrower, tapering set of
documents subject to collection, processing, and so on.84

83. Testimony of David M. Howard on behalf of Microsoft Corp., Transcript of Public
Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 79–80 (Jan. 9,
2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/public-hearings/civil-hearingtranscrip
t-2014-01-09.pdf.
84. See supra Figure 2. From Figure 4, it is clear that Figure 2 is not to scale. If this were
drawn to scale, the brim would be even wider, and the top would be very narrow.
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FIGURE 4: NUMBER OF PAGES OR DATA EQUIVALENT (IN 1000S) PRESERVED,
COLLECTED, AND PROCESSED FOR MICROSOFT CORPORATION
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As the disproportionate bulk associated with preservation becomes apparent,
the sense of urgency for new Rules governing preservation becomes obvious.
But why is the “discovery sombrero” a sombrero? Why such a wide base?

888

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:867

FIGURE 5: THE DISCOVERY SOMBRERO, WITH LOCUS OF DISPUTE
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Pre-filing preservation
The answer requires one to approach the question of discovery from the
perspective of the preserving party. This is an ex ante perspective, in which the
preserving party must make decisions before any uncertainty about the legal
claim is resolved.85 From this perspective, preservation is not part of litigation
at all, and at this point in time the preserving party is not dealing with “lawsuits,”
but with “disputes.” These disputes may or may not turn into lawsuits, let alone
federal lawsuits.86 To illustrate this idea, Figure 5 divides the discovery
sombrero by where the dispute ends up, rather than by stage of discovery.87

85. See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 639; Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61
BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 100 (2009).
86. See Spencer, supra note 10, at 2007‒08 (discussing the level of foreseeability needed to
trigger the duty to preserve).
87. See supra Figure 5. Note that the dashed line indicates that, among matters that end up
in state or federal court, some preservation occurs before the matter becomes a filed lawsuit, and
some preservation occurs after. The remaining stages all occur after filing, of course. Note, too,
that as before, the sections of the sombrero are not to scale.
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Survey respondents generally confirmed that a substantial portion of
preservation activity is conducted in the absence of a filed lawsuit.88 In contrast,
collection, processing, review, and production will usually occur in the context
of litigation.89 This is the crucial difference between stages of discovery that
federal courts have long regulated under the Rules, generally with success,90 and
preservation, a phase of discovery that currently vexes courts and litigants alike.
B. The Preservation Iceberg
This section focuses on the costs associated with preservation specifically.
The costs of preservation fall into two broad categories, which will be referred
to as fixed costs and variable costs.
Fixed costs are costs that do not depend on the volume of preservation activity
or the number of cases a company faces.91 These costs are “fixed” because they
do not arise in the context of individual litigation matters, but represent a
company’s ongoing expenses. For example, the costs of developing a repository
for e-mails preserved in anticipation of litigation will exist whether the company
faces 100 lawsuits or 1000 lawsuits; the specific scope of preservation rules or
the number of holds that will have to be issued will have little effect on this
cost.92 Fixed costs include the costs of maintaining a staff of attorneys, IT
specialists, and other professionals devoted to preservation activity, as well as
the costs of automated systems to manage litigation holds and preserve data.93
Virtually all prior reported information on the costs of preservation reflect only
the fixed costs of preservation-related technology.
Variable costs of preservation are costs that arise in the context of individual
litigation matters, and thus vary with the volume of preservation activity. The
primary variable cost is the time that non-legal employees subject to litigationhold obligations must divert from business activities to compliance with a
litigation hold. This lost time is a variable cost because the time spent by an
employee on litigation holds increases as either the number of holds rises or as
the complexity of each hold rises.
The Preservation Costs Survey sought to quantify both fixed and variable
costs of preservation. While collecting specific, quantitative estimates of fixed

88. Most companies do not track these numbers, but a few companies did provide such data.
These reports ranged from forty-four to seventy-seven percent of holds not being associated with
active litigation. Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 43.
89. Id.
90. See Civil Rules Survey, supra note 2, at 69‒70.
91. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 7‒11 (discussing in more detail
fixed and variable costs).
92. See Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at 86 (“[P]reservation responsibilities can
sometimes involve enterprise-level costs, such as would be incurred with the implementation of an
automatic legal-hold tool. Such applications are certainly costly and have an observable price tag,
but the expenditures are spread across all of the company’s present and future preservation needs.”).
93. See id. at 85.
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costs was infeasible for Phase III of the Survey, the author collected information
on fixed costs in interviews with a number of large companies in Phases I and
II. These interviews provided detailed information on several categories of fixed
costs.
With respect to fixed costs associated with personnel, these companies all had
legal IT or e-discovery groups with attorneys and paralegals devoted full- or
part-time to preservation activity. On average, the companies had two attorneys
and four paralegals or other legal professionals working full-time in a dedicated
legal IT or e-discovery group.
With respect to the fixed costs of technology, these companies also provided
estimates of the costs of automated preservation systems that ranged from
hundreds of thousands to tens of millions of dollars per system. One important
type of system in this area is the automated litigation-hold management system.
These systems automate the process of distributing, tracking, and monitoring
litigation-hold notices that are created by in-house counsel. The largest fixed
costs, however, are associated with the preservation of data itself. Every large
company surveyed has a diverse set of systems used to address preservation
obligations. Such an array of systems is necessary due to the large variety of
types of ESI, many of which have distinct business purposes and are used and
stored in different ways on a company’s computer systems.
These reports suggest that for large companies, the per-year fixed costs
associated with preservation activity run into the millions of dollars. Table 2
presents a rough but conservative calculation based on Survey results. The total
(measurable) fixed costs of preservation for a single, large company exceed $2.5
million per year. For smaller companies, though, fixed costs could be essentially
zero. Most smaller companies do not report having a dedicated e-discovery
team, legal IT function, or automated litigation hold system. See Figure 6.
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TABLE 2: APPROXIMATE FIXED COSTS OF PRESERVATION FOR A
HYPOTHETICAL LARGE COMPANY
Per_Year
Fixed Cost

Preservation Solution
A legal IT and/or e-discovery team

$1,000,000

Litigation-hold management system (implementation cost
amortized over a 5 year expected life)

$160,000

Maintenance of litigation-hold management system

$150,000

Automated data preservation system (implementation cost
amortized over a 5 year expected life)
Maintenance of automated data preservation system
Total

$1,000,000
$200,000
$2,510,000

FIGURE 6: SHARE REPORTING PRESERVATION PRACTICES, BY COMPANY SIZE
1
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This striking difference is likely due to the simple fact that smaller companies
face fewer lawsuits.94 The fixed investments of many large companies benefit
from large economies of scale.95 By leveraging legal and technical expertise and
automation, investment in these fixed costs lowers the per-matter (variable) cost
of preservation activities. However, the high up-front investment is only
justified by a large volume of litigation. As Figure 6 shows, while the very
largest companies almost uniformly use in-house preservation experts for
managing litigation holds, virtually none of the smallest companies have
separate legal IT or e-discovery staff. Similarly, automated litigation-hold
tracking software is virtually standard practice among large companies but is
uncommon among smaller companies.
As high as the fixed costs of preservation may be, the largest share of
preservation costs is variable: the costs in human time and effort to address
preservation obligations on a case-by-case basis. Individual employees placed
on hold or otherwise asked to engage in preservation activities must divert time
and attention away from normal business activities. In this respect, a day spent
responding to litigation-hold notices is just as significant a drain on worker
productivity as a sick day.
Prior to this Survey, the magnitude of this aspect of preservation costs was
unknown.96 The following calculation is used to determine the magnitude of
these costs: multiply the number of litigation matters per year,97 times the
number of employees on litigation hold per matter,98 times the number of hours

94. Companies with 1–1,000 employees reported an average of 27 active lawsuits (scaled
proportionally to company size) at the time of the survey. Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra
note 19, at 33 tbl.8. Companies with 1,001–10,000 employees reported an average of 228 lawsuits;
companies with 10,001–100,000 employees reported an average of 2,563; and companies with
more than 100,000 employees reported an average of 3,404. Id.
95. For example, one interviewed company spent around one million dollars to implement
and maintain software to assist in indexing and searching preserved data, but the interviewee saw
this cost as a fraction of the savings it has generated. Id. at 34 n.52.
96. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 28‒31 (discussing in more detail
the calculation of the variable costs of preservation).
97. This number was taken directly from data reported in responses to Phase III of the Survey.
98. This figure was derived from Phase I and Phase II companies that provided detailed data
based on litigation-hold tracking software. Based on the companies that provided data for this
calculation, about 0.12% of employees on average are subject to a hold for each litigation matter.
This estimate was applied to all companies, with a minimum of five employees per hold for smaller
companies. As a check on this latter figure, an analysis was conducted of employment cases,
defined in the Survey as employment discrimination and retaliation cases, to test the validity of
extrapolation from larger companies to smaller companies. Unlike certain categories of litigation
that uniquely affect large companies (such as antitrust), employment litigation is a risk for
companies of all sizes, and typical employment suits at large companies look very much like
employment suits at smaller companies in terms of stakes and numbers of “key players.” Focusing
only on employment litigation data indicates that the assumption that smaller companies have an
average of five employees on hold per litigation matter is actually a conservative estimate. Id. at
36‒37.
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per year a worker will spend on the litigation hold,99 times the average salary per
hour for employees in management occupations,100 per Expression 1.
EXPRESSION 1:
Wkrs.⁄
Holds⁄ ) = $⁄
($⁄Hr.) (Hours⁄
Yr.
Yr.
Worker) (
Hold) (
The estimates, broken down by company size, appear in Table 3. For
companies of all sizes, the costs in lost employee time are significant. For the
smallest companies in the Survey, the costs average over $12,000 per company
per year. The estimate of costs for the largest companies exceeds $38.6 million
per company per year. In sum, the two or three million dollars that a large
company might spend in a year on preservation-related systems may be no more
than the tip of the preservation iceberg.

99. This could include time spent reading, confirming receipt, and asking questions about a
litigation-hold notice; time spent changing personal device settings and other work practices to
comply with the litigation-hold notice; and time spent reviewing electronic and paper files to mark,
copy, or set aside files for preservation. The calculation uses an estimate of three hours per
employee per year spent on each litigation hold based on estimates reported by interviewed
companies; however, no surveyed company had a precise estimate. As the Survey found, few
companies track this type of cost.
100. This figure, $52.20/hour, is the average hourly wage of workers in management
occupations (across all sectors and all business sizes) provided by the latest data from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. See May 2012 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/oes/2012/may/oes_nat.htm#11-0000 (last
visited April 19, 2015).
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TABLE 3: ESTIMATED PER-COMPANY COSTS OF EMPLOYEE TIME LOST TO
LITIGATION HOLDS, BY COMPANY SIZE101
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Total
Employees

1–1,000

Matters
with Holds

Employees
per Matter

Employee
Hours per
Year

Time Cost
per Year

16

5

240

$12,528

1,001–10,000

249

11

8,217

$428,927

10,001–
100,000

1,245

71

265,185

$13,842,657

> 100,000

1,333

185

739,815

$38,618,343

C. The Long Tail of Costs
One question that existing, yet entirely anecdotal, evidence cannot answer is
whether the cases that have high preservation costs are typical or atypical. There
have been many anecdotes suggesting that preservation burdens are large, and
many anecdotes suggesting that they are not large.102 The Survey data reveals
that these conflicting anecdotes do not pose a credibility contest between two
contrary accounts. Instead, these divergent anecdotes on cost reflect different
aspects of the same phenomenon—an enormous amount of preservation activity
that is very unevenly distributed across litigation matters. This is the context in
which individual experiences with the costs of preservation must be understood.
Detailed, case-by-case data was collected on litigation holds from six
companies. These data sets together include information on over 3,600 separate
litigation matters and over 770,000 individual litigation-hold notices. The data
from a representative company appears in Figure 7; histograms for the remaining
five companies look essentially the same. This company’s dataset covers 390
distinct matters representing actual or anticipated civil litigation. For each
matter, the dataset provides the number of individuals subject to a litigation hold.

101. Columns (2) and (3) are averages within the company size categories in column (1).
Column (4) is the product of column (2) and column (3) times 3 hours per employee-hold. Column
(5) is column (4) times $52.20 per hour.
102. See supra notes 2‒3.
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Figure 7 shows the frequency with which litigation matters involve a given
number of employees subject to holds. For example, the left-most vertical bar
in Figure 7 represents the number of matters with twenty employees or fewer on
hold, the next bar indicates the number of matters with twenty-one to forty
employees on hold, and so on.103
FIGURE 7: DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES ON HOLD PER MATTER OF A
REPRESENTATIVE LARGE COMPANY, TOPCODED AT 500

As Figure 7 shows, most litigation matters involve litigation holds affecting
relatively few employees—well over half of the matters had twenty holds or
fewer. Yet, the distribution of litigation holds across matters is highly skewed,
and there is a “long tail” of matters in which huge numbers of employees are
placed on hold in each case. This means that a small percentage of litigation
matters can account for the bulk of all litigation-hold activity. Indeed, across
sampled companies, five percent of matters account for more than fifty-two
percent of litigation-hold notices issued.104
103. For graphical clarity, the distribution of the number of employees on hold per matter in
Figure 7 is topcoded at 500. Matters with more than 500 employees subject to hold are included in
the right-most vertical bar.
104. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 40 tbl.11. This pattern also holds
for employment litigation specifically. Across companies for which the data is available, the top
five percent of employment-related matters account for almost exactly half (49.5%) of all
employment-related litigation holds. See id. at 41 tbl.12.
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Notably, the patterns that appear in the Preservation Costs Survey data
resemble the patterns that other researchers have found in the context of outside
counsel’s litigation costs. In their Civil Rules Survey, Lee and Willging found
that while the median case had relatively low litigation costs ($15,000 for
plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants), the 95th percentile case involved costs of
approximately $300,000 for each party.105 Figure 8 presents the distribution of
litigation costs from the Civil Rules Survey.
FIGURE 8: DISTRIBUTION
FJC CIVIL RULES SURVEY DATA

OF

LITIGATION

COSTS

PER

PARTY,

Strikingly, even though Figure 7 describes preservation costs borne by the
client and includes matters not filed in court while Figure 8 assesses litigation
costs incurred by outside counsel for filed lawsuits, the patterns are virtually
identical. Also parallel is the fact that in the Civil Rules Survey data, the top five
percent of cases accounted for more than half of all litigation costs.106 Notably,
this long tail of litigation costs is the product of discovery costs, not the product

105. Civil Rules Survey, supra note 2, at 35–37.
106. To be precise, 5% of all cases accounted for 59.4% of defendants’ total litigation costs
across all cases. Author’s calculations (available upon request from author) are based on data from
the Civil Rules Survey. The author thanks Emery G. Lee, III for sharing the Civil Rules Survey data
with him.
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of trials, motion practice, or the like. Federal Judicial research indicates that
while most cases have little or no discovery costs, in the fraction of cases that
do actively involve discovery, discovery often accounts for the vast majority of
all costs.107 This suggests that the long tail of costs is a phenomenon that broadly
describes all phases of preservation and discovery.
In sum, these results reveal that preservation costs are not high in most cases,
but the distribution is highly skewed, with a long tail in which a relatively small
number of highly complex and burdensome cases account for a large share of
the total costs. Thus, the “typical” case is no cause for concern, but the
“average” case may have a very high level of preservation activity because a
small but important number of cases substantially drive up the total costs of
preservation.
IV. THREE IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND RULEMAKING
A. The Sombrero and the Erie/Hanna Boundary
As noted above, the Federal Rules have never mentioned the duty to preserve
nor placed any requirements on what data litigants retain—only what they
produce. Nonetheless, current federal case law has created rules governing
preservation that impose preservation obligations on parties even before a suit is
filed.108 This case law is almost exclusively the product of the district courts, as
discovery-related orders and most orders imposing sanctions for failure to
preserve are interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable.109 This raises the
doctrinal question of whether a wholly judge-made federal common law of
preservation is consistent with the Erie doctrine.
Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts cannot create rules of decision through
federal common law, but must decide cases by interpreting and applying state
substantive law or codified federal law.110 Underlying this decision was the
recognition of the principle, embodied in the Rules of Decision Act, that
“[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress,

107. Stancil, supra note 85, at 100 (“According to one recent study, discovery consumes
approximately 50% of all federal litigation expenditures; moreover, that study noted that discovery
can account for ‘as much as 90% of the litigation costs in the cases where discovery is actively
employed.’”) (citing Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, to Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 11,
1999) (192 F.R.D. 340, 357)).
108. See Spencer, supra note 10, at 2005‒08 (discussing varying approaches to pre-litigation
preservation obligations among district and circuit courts and their impact on potential, not actual,
litigants).
109. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court:
A Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733, 735 (2006)
(describing the various approaches courts take toward permitting review of orders for the discovery
of allegedly privileged information).
110. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. . . . There is no federal
general common law.”111
The notion that a federal common law of preservation might trample upon the
domain of state substantive law, thereby running afoul of the Erie doctrine, is
hardly obvious. Preservation seems procedural in nature, and every court has
inherent power to ensure the integrity of its proceedings and judgments.112
Therefore, a federal judge would naturally assume she can invoke judge-made
federal law to regulate the pre-filing preservation activity of litigants in federal
court.113 It would seem almost tautological that if a federal judge is asked to
enforce preservation law, then the subjects of that law are parties in federal court
whose actions are governed by federal procedures for conduct in court. The
shaded area in Figure 9 illustrates this view of the scope of the federal law on
preservation.
FIGURE 9: THE PERCEIVED SCOPE OF THE DUTY TO PRESERVE

Disputes that
end up in
Federal Court

Disputes that
end up in State
Court

Disputes settled
out of court

Disputes
dropped
without suit

Pre-filing preservation

111. Id. See also Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012).
112. Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 833‒35 (2008)
(describing differing views about the judicial branch’s inherent control over judicial procedure
relative to that of Congress).
113. Cf. id. at 834 n.65.
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The problem is that preservation decisions are often made ex ante, i.e., before
a lawsuit is filed.114 If federal rules governing preservation apply to pre-filing
conduct, then the federal rules govern the conduct of parties in every dispute that
could end up in federal court, including those disputes that ultimately end up in
state court or are never litigated at all. The shaded area in Figure 10 represents
the extent to which federal preservation law could affect cases. (The partially
shaded area denotes the possibility of federal preservation duties affecting cases
filed in state court while there is still a possibility of removal to federal court).
FIGURE 10: THE EFFECTIVE SCOPE OF THE DUTY TO PRESERVE

Disputes that end
up in Federal
Court

Disputes that end
up in State Court

Disputes settled
out of court

Disputes dropped
without suit

Pre-filing preservation
Of course, federal law regulates the conduct of companies and individuals
outside of federal court in many instances, including behavior that affects
preservation and discovery.115 For example, laws define what happens when a
114. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 10, at 2006‒11 (exploring the standards courts use to
determine whether parties’ duties to preserve have been triggered, which are triggered prior to filing
the lawsuit).
115. See id. at 2006 n.7‒8.
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witness is murdered and exactly how long and on what kind of media one must
store certain emails.116 But these are substantive laws enacted by Congress or
regulations promulgated by administrative agencies pursuant to statute, in the
same way that laws proscribing the murder of non-witnesses or regulations
addressing the proper storage of meat are substantive laws that dictate conduct
outside of litigation. In contrast, the federal law of preservation considered in
this article is entirely a creature of common law, yet it governs the conduct of
parties outside of federal court and even in the absence of any litigation, state or
federal. The fact that a number of states have created independent causes of
action for the tort of spoliation of evidence further reveals the extent to which
the overarching federal common law of preservation conflicts with the Erie
doctrine.117
Preservation decisions are, by and large, made prior to litigation when a
potential defendant faces great uncertainty about where, if at all, it will be
sued.118 Consequently, plaintiffs can exploit this legal variation to their
advantage, choosing the forum “with the most demanding requirements of the
toughest court to have spoken.”119 Nor can the process of appellate review iron
out these stark and seemingly arbitrary variations in preservation standards
because these standards are the product of non-appealable interlocutory rulings
by district courts.120 To use the idioms of Erie and Hanna, these variations
across courts invite “forum-shopping” and the arbitrary and uncertain
application of these conflicting precedents leads to “inequitable administration
of the laws.”121
Still, preservation in some sense is procedural, and it would be absurd to deny
federal courts any say in the preservation activity of litigants. With the benefit
of a clearer picture of the reach of current preservation law beyond the federal
courtroom, one sees that there remain two complementary ways forward that
restrict federal courts’ inherent, common law powers to their proper domain
without requiring more restraint than necessary when policing spoliation.
The first of these is through the federal rulemaking process. Federal judicial
power under the Rules stems from the Rules Enabling Act, which authorizes the
federal courts to enact rules of “practice and procedure” that do “not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.”122 Importantly, because the Rules
116. See 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2012) (murder of a witness); Commodities and Securities
Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4 (2012) (recording retention obligations for securities exchange
members, brokers, and dealers).
117. See MARGARET KOESEL, ET AL., SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES
FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 50 (Daniel F. Gourash, ed., 2000).
118. See Spencer, supra note 10, at 2007 (explaining that a potential litigant’s duty to preserve
is triggered “prior to the initiation of litigation”).
119. Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 523 (D. Md. 2010), aff’d No.
2012-1638, 2012 WL 616939 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 20, 2013).
120. See, e.g., Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009).
121. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).

2015]

The Discovery Sombrero and Other Metaphors for Litigation

901

Enabling Act and the Rules promulgated thereunder are codified federal law,
Erie by its terms does not apply.123 Rather, the Supreme Court has treated the
Rules Enabling Act as creating a more forgiving standard for legitimate judicial
lawmaking through the Rules.124 Sibbach and Hanna merely ask whether the
Federal Rule “really regulates procedure” regardless of whether it also affects
substantive rights.125 It is self-evident that the preservation law “really regulates
procedure.”
The second method is to limit the scope of federal court regulation of prelitigation preservation activity to solely pre-litigation activity that is directed
toward the court. It would then become difficult to question using the inherent
power to punish litigants who—in anticipation of a lawsuit—deliberately act to
undermine the integrity of the court proceedings. This is exactly the sort of
behavior against which the Supreme Court permitted the deployment of inherent
power in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.126 While the misconduct in Chambers
occurred out of court, and prior to the filing of a federal lawsuit, the Court
emphasized the bad faith and intentional character of conduct whose purpose
was to frustrate the anticipated federal proceedings.127
As applied to preservation, this is the approach taken by the Southern District
of Texas in Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata,128 which held that
bad faith was required for the court to issue sanctions for a pre-litigation failure
to preserve.129 But the law is sharply divided on this point, and a bad faith
requirement is not applied consistently under current law.130 A more widely
cited case from the Southern District of New York, Pension Committee of
University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities, LLC,131
imposed sanctions for pre-litigation failure to preserve based on gross
negligence.132

123. See Spencer, supra note 10, at 2031–32.
124. See Shady Grove Orthopedics Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010).
125. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co, 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). This rule was
followed in Shady Grove, albeit only by a plurality of the court. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407
(2010).
126. 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991).
127. Id. at 37, 50‒51 (affirming the district court’s imposition of sanctions on a party whose
“entire course of conduct . . . evidenced bad faith and an attempt to perpetuate a fraud on the court,”
including contact that took place before the lawsuit was filed).
128. 688 F.Supp.2d 598 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
129. Id. at 614.
130. See Robert A. Weninger, Electronic Discovery and Sanctions for Spoliation: Perspectives
from the Classroom, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 775, 790 (2012) (explaining that the federal circuits differ
by requiring either negligence, gross negligence, or bad faith before issuing sanctions).
131. 685 F.Supp.2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (abrogated in part by Chin v. Port Auth. of New
York & New Jersey, 685 F.3d 135, 162 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that failure to institute a litigation
hold is not gross negligence per se)).
132. Id. at 496.
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B. The Iceberg and the Law/Technology Boundary
The preservation iceberg reveals that preservation is a much more expensive,
higher-stakes stage of discovery than was previously understood. It also negates
the belief that technology alone can reduce the costs and burdens of discovery,
especially in the context of preservation. An irony of the debate on preservation
costs is that the most often cited costs of preservation—technology costs—are
only a small part of the problem, and for large companies, reducing the burdens
of preservation will probably involve further increasing technology costs. Total
burdens will fall as human costs are reduced, even as (and precisely because) the
most salient costs of preservation—big ticket technology spending—will rise.
But that is the good news.
The bad news is that the iceberg is primarily a large-company phenomenon.
For smaller companies, there is no “tip of the iceberg.” All or nearly all of their
preservation costs are human costs. Without the scale of litigation activity that
justifies the fixed costs associated with litigation-hold management systems—
data vaults, and legal IT staff—the costs borne by smaller businesses are not
technology costs at all, but human costs.
This helps explain the Survey result that smaller companies and larger
companies reported similar burdens. Precisely because they are smaller and face
fewer lawsuits, it is not generally cost effective for smaller companies to make
expensive, but beneficial, investments in sophisticated automated systems or inhouse expertise. Thus, although preservation disputes or spoliation allegations
are rarer for smaller companies, these companies are also far less equipped to
handle these controversies.
This is true even for companies in the technology field itself; one respondent,
a tech company with about 100 employees, explained:
We are a small company, but we are in a space where we need to
protect our IP and also to prevent customers from eluding payment.
We manage most of the process in house, but it is a huge burden on
our IT. We are looking at vaulting solutions for e-mail, which should
be a big help. But the costs are enormous, and vendors are unwilling
to give us a good demo or trial vault.133
Instead, smaller companies may have to rely on ad-hoc, outside assistance,
which may be less efficient and more expensive on a per-case basis. One
respondent, an industrial company with about 200 employees, explained:
Our company along with every other company in our industry is
involved in several suits concerning one toxic tort-related issue. We
are a very small player in this field. Yet, we have to produce the same
documents as the big guys. In our case, our IT employee, our
President, our Accountant, our Attorney, etc. [have] to devote all of

133. Survey Response of Respondent 2865509178 (Anonymous ID).
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their time to answer discovery. We also employ an outside law firm
at an hourly rate to help us. It is very costly.134
Thus, technology is not a substitute for legal reform because technological
solutions are only practical for the largest companies for which the economies
of scale from high-tech solutions justify their high price tags. For smaller
companies—those with hundreds of employees—technology plays a much
smaller role in the preservation process. From this point of view, legal
innovation, rather than technological innovation, may be the best hope for
controlling the costs of individuals, small businesses, and NGOs, and virtually
every potential litigant other than the largest and most sophisticated litigants.
C. The Long Tail and Transsubstantivity/Tailoring Boundary
The fact that most of the costs of preservation are generated by a small fraction
of cases suggests that it may be productive to devise Rules to control
preservation costs and focus those Rules on particular categories of large,
information-intensive cases. This may require steps away from a commitment
to transsubstantivity to which the Rules generally adhere. But there are ways to
design discovery rules to address cost that neither sort cases into substantive
categories nor require judges to do so. The “long tail” provides us with a way
to do this. Because preservation and discovery costs are highly skewed, the
Federal Rules can set presumptive, quantitative limits on the scale of
preservation and discovery such that the “typical” case is unaffected but the
court and the parties have levers for controlling litigation costs in particularly
large or complex cases.
Parties should be provided tools to reduce discovery costs because active
judicial oversight of discovery, although widely praised as highly effective,
rarely occurs.135 Close judicial oversight of preservation is even less feasible
given that the duty to preserve may trigger before a suit is even filed.136
Furthermore, the fog of litigation is greatest at the outset of a case; yet this is
precisely when judicial supervision of preservation would be required.137
Thus, it is essential that the parties have tools for negotiating the scope of
preservation and discovery. It is not enough to rely on negotiations to arise
134. Survey Response of Respondent 2867300205 (Anonymous ID). Note that this company
refers to its “IT employee” in the singular. Id.
135. Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 638‒39 (finding the judicial oversight ineffective and
impractical).
136. See Surowiec v. Capital Title Agency, Inc., 790 F.Supp.2d 997, 1005 (D. Ariz. 2011).
137. Judges may also have little incentive to monitor preservation and discovery costs; if high
discovery costs induce settlement, as many models of litigation predict, and judges prefer leisure
to effort, then active case management not only imposes the direct and immediate cost of effort on
the part of the judge, but it increases the likelihood that the case will not settle, which requires
further judicial effort. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 31
(Harvard Univ. Press 2013); William H.J. Hubbard, Nuisance Litigation 1‒2 (April 1, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Univ. of Cal.-Berkeley School of Law), http://scholarship.
law.berkeley.edu/law_econ/Spring2014/Schedule/12/.
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organically or to require negotiations by rule. In those cases where negotiating
is productive, the parties have an incentive to negotiate regardless of any
requirement to do so, and in those cases where it is not productive, requiring
negotiations to occur will not make it so. The question remains—how can the
Rules get parties to sit down and address preservation in a cost-effective way?
To some extent, there is little that the Rules can do because for most disputes the
duty to preserve attaches before a lawsuit is filed, and in many cases before an
opposing party contacts the preserving party.138 At least initially in these
disputes, the scope, and therefore costs, of preservation are set without any
opportunity for parties to work together to control these costs.139
To the extent that it is feasible for the parties to work together to control
preservation costs, the Rules can give the parties incentives to negotiate a scope
of preservation that prioritizes important data while attending to cost concerns
as well. Under the current Rules, the parties do not have any incentive to
negotiate. Because courts lack the information to conduct a careful balancing of
the costs and benefits envisioned by Rule 26, the default rule under current law
is usually to place no firm limits on preservation or discovery.140
How does this affect incentives? Consider the scenario where an individual
plaintiff (or putative class action representative) sues a large company. The
plaintiff has essentially no data relevant to the case, but the company has vast
quantities of data, some of which may be relevant to the case and some of which
may not. The plaintiff’s attorney has little incentive to agree to reasonable limits
on the scope of preservation in order to save costs, as the plaintiff will have no
preservation costs in any event. The problem is that the parties do not have
anything over which to negotiate.141
Compared to other stages of discovery in “asymmetrical” litigation,
preservation is especially problematic. A plaintiff with no information still has
an incentive to limit discovery requests for production because larger production
increases the plaintiff’s own costs of review. But a broad demand for
preservation has no such self-correcting feature; the costs are borne entirely by
the defendant.
If both sides to a dispute have similar preservation burdens, then there
certainly is something to negotiate over. Each party can agree to preserve only
the documents most likely to be relevant and not preserve the rest. Each then
saves a lot of time, money, and aggravation at the cost of a small potential loss
138. See Surowiec, 790 F.Supp.2d at 1005.
139. DISCOVERY SUBCOMM., supra note 13, at 4. As one in-house counsel put it, “I can’t talk
to opposing counsel because there is no opposing counsel.” Id.
140. See supra notes 35‒39 and accompanying text.
141. There is a qualification to this: The defendant and the plaintiff could negotiate over how
much the defendant has to pay the plaintiff in order to avoid the unconfined duty to preserve. But
this sort of negotiation—usually referred to as a “nuisance settlement”—is definitely not the kind
of negotiation that the author suspects the Rules aspire to encourage. See Hubbard, supra note 137,
at 2.

2015]

The Discovery Sombrero and Other Metaphors for Litigation

905

in the number of relevant documents. This is exactly the sort of sound costbenefit analysis that the Rules anticipate. The agreed-upon scope of preservation
may be over- or under-inclusive, but the costs and benefits are symmetrical and,
more importantly, agreed upon—and therefore settled and insulated from
wasteful second-guessing down the road.
If this analysis is correct, then the majority of preservation headaches would
arise in the context of “asymmetrical” litigation where one side has little or
nothing to preserve, and the other has large quantities of data. Using individualversus-company (as opposed to company-versus-company) litigation as a proxy
for asymmetrical litigation, the Survey’s findings confirm this prediction.
TABLE 4: PRESERVATION-RELATED PROBLEMS BY OPPOSING PARTY TYPE
(5 = “VERY OFTEN” AND 1 = “VERY RARELY”)
Configuration of Parties

Average Rating

Large, complex matters,
individuals on other side

3.81

Large, complex matters,
businesses on other side

3.45

Small, routine matters,
individuals on other side

2.99

Small, routine matters,
business on other side

2.59

Table 4 presents the results from the Survey.142 Respondents reported higher
levels of preservation-related problems in litigation against individuals than in
litigation against other businesses. Further, these differences are highly
statistically significant.143
The key, therefore, is to structure the Rules so that in cases where costs are
likely to be large, both parties have something to lose and something to gain in
preservation negotiations. The Rules governing production in discovery already
do this. Rule 30 sets presumptive limits on the number and length of
142. A total of 122 respondents provided responses to this set of questions on the frequency of
preservation-related problems based on the type of litigation and opposing party.
143. Using these results, the Survey tested two hypotheses using paired, two-tailed t-tests: (1)
among large, complex matters, the means for cases against individuals and for cases against
businesses are (statistically) the same, and (2) among small, routine matters, the means for cases
against individuals and for cases against businesses are (statistically) the same. Both hypotheses
are rejected at the one percent level.
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depositions.144 Rule 33 sets presumptive limits on the number of written
interrogatories.145 To avoid obvious injustices, Rule 26(b)(2)(A) permits the
court to issue an order altering these presumptive limits.146 In practice, however,
most exceptions to these presumptions are negotiated by the parties and not
determined by judicial order. Meaningful negotiation occurs in this context
because the Rules, by construction, ensure that both sides of any discovery
dispute have bargaining chips, as they can agree to more or fewer depositions.
Thus, in the preservation and document discovery context, a similar approach
should be effective. Establishing a presumptive limit of fifteen to twenty
custodians to be subject to litigation holds ensures that every party to a
preservation dispute has bargaining chips. In most cases, this presumptive limit
will be uncontroversial and not disturbed. In the cases where it is controversial,
even a party with no preservation obligations itself will have an incentive to
make meaningful rather than outlandish preservation demands because the other
party now has a bargaining chip. A party can offer to preserve more in exchange
for cost-justified concessions with respect to other aspects of discovery, or in
exchange for cost-sharing between the parties.
The long tail of litigation costs indicates that Rules based on presumptive
limits can be calibrated to leave the large numbers of cases with modest costs
and few discovery disputes untouched, while directing parties’ efforts, and
potentially courts’ attention, to the smaller set of cases with high costs.
Presumptive limits can be set relatively low, but still impose no binding
constraints on parties in most disputes. Existing Rules addressing depositions
appear to do this already. For example, data collected by Emery Lee III and
Thomas Willging indicates that in most cases, surveyed attorneys deposed five
or fewer non-expert witnesses, well below the limit of ten set by Rule 30.147
V. CONCLUSION
Until now, knowledge of the costs of preservation and discovery depended on
anecdote and speculation. This research on preservation costs has made a first
step toward a more rigorous, quantitative understanding of how preservation
activity is distributed across cases and how its various costs stack up against
each other. The discovery sombrero, the preservation iceberg, and the long tail
of costs serve as basic, stylized facts in this regard.
These facts also serve to inform legal and policy debate. This includes, most
immediately, currently pending amendments to the Federal Rules, which, if
adopted, would expressly address preservation for the first time. As the

144. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d) (providing that each party may take no
more than ten depositions, each of which may be no longer than seven hours).
145. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a) (providing that each party may serve no more than twenty-five
written interrogatories upon another party).
146. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(A).
147. Civil Rules Survey, supra note 2, at 10.
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discussion of the discovery sombrero and Erie makes clear, moving the locus of
federal lawmaking in this area from federal common law to rulemaking under
the Rules Enabling Act is a welcome development. Additionally, as the
discussion of the preservation iceberg makes clear, the decision of the
rulemaking committees to act now rather than wait for technological solutions
is good news for the vast majority of parties who cannot afford to use the high
fixed costs of technology to control the costs of preservation.
Of course, the merits of exactly how the Rules address preservation is up for
debate. In the discussion of the long tail of costs, this article advocates for an
approach that would create clear, presumptive limits on the scope of preservation
and discovery in order to encourage mutually beneficial bargaining that would
define the proper scope of preservation and discovery in cost-intensive cases.
Such an approach is admittedly far from perfect because it does little to address
preservation costs that arise before the parties join issue in court, but it is an
important potential path not yet taken by the rulemakers.
More importantly, though, any meaningful assessment of the merits of
standards governing preservation must take into account both the costs and
benefits of preservation. While this research has begun to quantify the costs,
quantifying the benefits of preservation is as elusive today as quantifying costs
once was.
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